Read the full reading and answer all of the guiding questions based on the reading.

Answer all of the following questions after reading:
1) How did the Articles of Confederation allocate powers to the states versus the
federal government?
2) Why, in your view, did the Americans divide powers in this way under the
Articles of Confederation?
3) Would you have voted to ratify the Articles of Confederation? Why or why not?
4) List 2 different approaches that states took when their citizens – in the face of
an economic downturn – were having trouble repaying their debts in the
mid-1780s.
5) What is inflation, why did it arise in some states during the “critical period” of
the mid- 1780s, and did it favor creditors (lenders) or debtors (borrowers)?
6) To what extent do you think Congress’s very limited authority under the
Articles of Confederation contributed to the nation’s problems during the “critical
period?”
7) What was Madison’s main concern about majority rule? Was there evidence
from the “critical period” that supported his concern?
8) Please identify at least two changes Madison recommended to help remedy
what he saw as “vices” in the new nation’s political system.
9) Do you agree with Madison’s strategy for addressing these vices? Give 1-2
reasons why or why not.
10) Do you think the Constitutional Convention was a response to the critical
period? Why or why not?
11) Many delegates at the constitutional convention believed that the powers of
the federal government should be specifically enumerated (listed) in the new
constitution. If you had been a delegate at the convention who worried about the
various problems that emerged during the critical period, what powers would you
have granted to the federal government under the new constitution, and what
powers – if any – would you have denied to the states?
12) List 1-2 advantages of both an absolute Federal Negative and a limited
Federal Negative.
13) If you had been a delegate at the convention in 1787, would you have
supported the inclusion of a “federal negative” in the constitution? If so, would
you have favored the absolute version or the weaker version? If not, why not?
Provide a few reasons.

HIGH SCHOOL CASE METHOD PROJECT
DRAFT
REV: JANUARY 22, 2018

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Professor David Moss and Research Associate Marc Campasano prepared this case. Tim Lambert provided the annotations. This
case was developed from published sources. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School.
HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of
primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.
Note: Annotated versions of Harvard Business School cases include the entire text of the original version. In addition, they
provide concise summaries of each section of the case, define essential vocabulary, and highlight key terms.
Copyright © 2016 President and Fellows of Harvard College. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise
reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.
DAVID MOSS
MARC CAMPASANO
James Madison, the ‘Federal Negative,’ and the
Making of the U.S. Constitution – Annotated
Edition
On June 8th, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, delegates from across
the United States began discussing a curious proposal to expand federal power over the states.
James Madison of Virginia had suggested that the new constitution include a “federal
negative,” which would give Congress the authority to veto any law passed by a state
legislature. He viewed this as a critical safeguard against unchecked power at the state level.
In late May, Madison’s Virginia delegation had presented a plan for the constitution that
included a watered-down version of the federal negative. Now, in June, Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina revived the original version, calling it “the corner stone of an efficient national
Government.”1
Not everyone agreed with Pinckney’s assessment, however. Opponents charged that
Madison’s federal negative would allow Congress to “enslave the states” and let “large States
crush the small ones.”2 Indeed, the question of how much power – and what types of power
– to vest in the federal government went to the very heart of the debate that unfolded in
Philadelphia that summer.
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 capped a tumultuous period in American history.
In 1783, after eight years of war, Britain formally recognized its former colonies as the
independent United States of America. Within just a few years, however, the triumphant
Americans found themselves facing calamities on many fronts, ranging from federal
insolvency and widespread economic recession to an armed rebellion in western
Massachusetts. Said George Washington, the hero of the Revolutionary War, “I am really
mortified beyond expression that in the moment of our Acknowledged Independence we
should, by our conduct, verify the predictions of our transatlantic foe, & render ourselves
ridiculous & contemptible in the eyes of all Europe.”3
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Sharing Washington’s frustration and embarrassment, James Madison came to believe that
the economic and social turmoil plaguing America in the mid-1780s could be traced to defects
in the Articles of Confederation, which had been adopted as the nation’s governing document
in 1781. After extensive research on past republics and confederacies, Madison concluded that
the theory of state sovereignty underlying the Articles was deeply flawed: lodging nearly all
power in the states was a recipe for disaster. What was needed, Madison argued, was an
entirely new constitution that would create a strong but limited central government with
well-defined powers, including the power to veto state laws. Whether Madison could
persuade his fellow delegates at the Constitutional Convention was far from clear, but there
could be little doubt how much was at stake as the new nation struggled to find its footing in
Philadelphia.
Toward a New Nationa
The United States began as thirteen British colonies in North America. Each colony
had its own local government, but all were ruled by the central government of Great
Britain. Colonists could vote for local lawmakers, but they could not vote for any
members of the British government. For many decades, both sides were happy with this
arrangement. The colonial economy grew quickly, as did the population.
In the 1760s, the British government began to increase taxes on the colonists. The
colonists had no say in this decision, so they called the taxes unfair. Colonists argued
there should be “No Taxation without Representation.” Over time, anger toward the taxes
grew into anger toward British rule in general. Some protests, particularly in Boston,
turned violent. In 1774, Britain put Boston under military rule.
Leaders from across the colonies called a meeting in Philadelphia to organize a
response. This meeting, known as the “Continental Congress,” called for more protests.
Meanwhile, Massachusetts was preparing for a full-scale rebellion. In April 1775,
Massachusetts colonists and British soldiers fought their first battle. The Revolutionary
War had begun.
Vocabulary:
Assemblies – groups of elected lawmakers
Parliament – an elected group that wrote laws
for the entire British Empire
Edict – law
Effigies – roughly made models of particular
persons, meant to be burned in protest
Massacre – the brutal killing of multiple
people
Key Terms:
Sugar Act and Stamp Act
“Virtual Representation”
“Boston Massacre”
Boston Tea Party
Continental Congress

a Portions of this case borrow heavily from David Moss, “Constructing a Nation: The United States and Their Constitution, 1763-
1792,” HBS Case No. 9-795-063 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1994).
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The United States began as thirteen British colonies located along the eastern seaboard of
North America. The region possessed an abundance of natural resources – especially land –
and the typical colonist lived well by world standards. One prominent historian maintained
that as of 1774 the colonists’ living standards were “probably the highest achieved for the
great bulk of the population in any country up to that time.”4 Between 1650 and 1750, the
population of the North American colonies increased from 50,000 to nearly 1.2 million, even
as the Native American population fell sharply, particularly as a result of disease. By 1770,
the colonial population had nearly doubled again, reaching over 2 million (see Exhibit 1).
More than three-quarters of the colonial population worked in agriculture, and about twothirds of white male farmers owned their own land. Blacks, nearly all of whom were slaves,
comprised about one-fifth of the colonial population as of 1770.5 Although slavery was legal
in all of the colonies, most slaves worked in the South, typically cultivating rice and tobacco
for export. Cotton was not yet an important crop.
Although disputes occasionally arose between the colonies and the mother country, before
the 1760s they were few and far between. The British Government controlled trade and
foreign policy, but otherwise left the colonists a great deal of authority over their own affairs.
Although in principle most colonies were run by governors appointed by the British crown,
in practice the colonies’ elected assemblies enjoyed considerable power and discretion. Apart
from a few import duties that were set in Britain, these assemblies decided local tax policy
themselves.6 The colonists were legally required to trade within the British Empire in most
cases but still benefitted from guaranteed markets for their agricultural products, from access
to English manufactured goods, and from the protection of the British military.
“Taxation without Representation”
This mutually beneficial relationship began to deteriorate only as the British felt new
financial pressures in the 1760s. After concluding a very long but ultimately successful war
against French and Native American forces on North American soil in 1763, the British
Government determined that the colonists were vastly under-taxed. Compared to citizens of
the British Isles, the American colonists paid next to nothing in taxes. British officials, who
faced a dramatically enlarged national debt after the French and Indian War, believed that
the Americans should begin to share the costs of their own defense (see Exhibit 2).7
In 1764, therefore, the British Parliament passed the Sugar Act, which placed new
regulations on the colonial sugar trade and imposed heavy taxes on a number of popular
colonial imports, including wine and silk. Although some New Englanders attempted to fight
the edict by refusing to buy British goods, their non-importation campaign failed to achieve
widespread acceptance. The colonists’ response was far more dramatic the following year,
when the British passed the Stamp Act, which levied taxes on nearly all types of colonial
documents from newspapers to licenses. Incensed colonists reacted violently, burning effigies
of British officials and physically threatening tax collectors. In most places, the colonists’
tactics effectively blocked implementation of the Stamp Act. The non-importation campaign
also took on new life during the crisis and began exacting a heavy toll on British exporters.
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In the emerging rebellion, the colonists coalesced around the principle of “no taxation
without representation.” The British Parliament had seized the power to tax from the
monarchy in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and this right was often celebrated as a
foundation of British freedom and parliamentary democracy. The colonists viewed the new
taxes in North America as a violation of these same ideals because they had no elected
representatives in Parliament. The British government strenuously disagreed, claiming that
the colonies did have a voice in Parliament through the principle of “virtual representation.”
This idea, championed by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Grenville, suggested that each
Member of Parliament represented the entire empire, not only those who voted him into
office.8
Although Parliament bowed to political pressures at home and repealed the Stamp Act,
the conflict was by no means over. British military commanders in North America began
redeploying troops from the interior to the coastal cities in response to the colonists’
increasingly organized resistance. Meanwhile, Parliament passed the Townshend Acts in
1767, which levied a variety of new taxes on colonial imports, riling the colonists once again.
By 1770, tempers were so short in Boston that nervous British troops fired on an unruly group
of demonstrators, killing five of them. The “Boston Massacre” only further inflamed the
colonists’ feelings of injustice and mistrust.
After yet another tactical retreat in 1770, involving the repeal of most of the Townshend
duties, Parliament passed the Tea Act in 1773. The Tea Act offered special advantages to
British traders who re-exported tea to the colonies. Its primary purpose was to eliminate
smuggled Dutch tea from the American market and thus bolster Britain’s troubled East India
Company. As a byproduct, it also severely undercut New England merchants who had
enjoyed a lucrative trade in smuggled tea, and it effectively re-imposed an existing tax on tea
imports, which the smuggling operations had circumvented. Convinced that these new
British rules further infringed on their independence, the colonists again resorted to violence.
They threatened incoming ships carrying tea, and, one night in December, dramatically
dumped 105,000 pounds of British tea cargo into the Boston Harbor. Outraged at the ”Boston
Tea Party,” the Royal Government immediately shut down Boston’s port and attempted to
place Massachusetts under military rule. Declared King George III, “The die is now cast. The
Colonies must either submit or triumph.”9
As the King suspected, dissent was now spreading rapidly and threatening to become a
full-scale rebellion. In September 1774, representatives from twelve colonies (all except
Georgia) met in Philadelphia for a “Continental Congress,” which quickly revived and
intensified the non-importation campaign. Massachusetts citizens began establishing their
own governmental institutions the very same year. The growing resentment between the
Americans and the British came to a head on April 19th, 1775, when the first shots of the
American Revolution were fired just outside of Boston, on the Lexington town green. To their
astonishment, British military leaders soon discovered that the American rebels – though
highly unconventional and undisciplined by traditional standards – constituted a formidable
challenge.
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Managing the War Effort
On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress declared that the colonies were independent
from Britain. Each colony became a state within a new nation called the United States of
America. But now the Americans had to form new governments and figure out how to
pay for a war.
Most Americans did not trust strong centralized power (like the British government).
During the war, they kept most power at the state level. By 1777, most states had written
constitutions to define their governments. All were based on the idea of popular
sovereignty, but usually only white men could vote. The state governments formed
militias and levied taxes to pay for them. When taxes were not enough, the states also
borrowed money.
Meanwhile, the Continental Congress became the nation’s central government. It
organized the Continental Army and put George Washington in command. But Congress
did not have the power to levy taxes to pay for the war. Instead, it printed paper money
called Continentals. The value of the paper money was supposed to be based on taxes that
would be collected later. But as Congress printed more and more Continentals, the bills
lost value. Prices of all goods rose rapidly, in a process called inflation. Meanwhile,
Congress also had to borrow large sums of money.
Vocabulary:
Ad hoc – arranged for a particular purpose only
Militia – a military force made up of local citizens
Popular sovereignty – the idea that all political power
comes from the people themselves
Suffrage – the right to vote
Centralized – controlled by a single, central power
Levy – to create or impose (a tax, for example)
Depreciation – a decrease in the value of a currency,
compared to other currencies
Creditors – people who lend money
Interest rates – a measure of the extra money (interest)
that a borrower must pay back on a loan
Key Terms:
State constitutions
Continental Army
George Washington
“Not worth a Continental”
Inflation
By the time the American colonists formally declared their independence from Britain on
July 4, 1776, the philosophical question about what form of government was best had become
a pressing practical one. British administrative structures began crumbling in the early 1770s
as the rebellion took hold, leaving the colonists little choice but to erect new governmental
institutions. Revolutionary leaders in most states established ad hoc legislative bodies in order
to raise taxes and form militias. Through the pivotal year of 1776, seven states adopted formal
constitutions, and most of the others soon followed. By embracing these new legal
frameworks, “Americans had discovered a way to legalize revolution.”10 Significantly, all of
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the state constitutions were grounded on the principle of popular sovereignty and, in most
cases, extended suffrage to all white males who owned at least a small amount of property.11
Although most governmental authority and responsibility remained firmly lodged at the
state level, the Continental Congress played an important role in coordinating the war effort
against Britain – for example, by creating the Continental Army and appointing George
Washington of Virginia as its Commander-in-Chief. Over the course of the war, the army
never reached the full strength that many national leaders envisaged.12 The American people
largely distrusted centralized military power, especially given their experience under British
rule. Reflecting this anxiety (and adding to the challenge of managing the war effort), the
Americans fielded at least fourteen distinct force structures during the war: “the thirteen state
militias and the Continental Army.”13
Financing the war effort proved equally challenging, especially because it was unclear
whether the Continental Congress had the legal authority or the popular support necessary
to levy taxes. Perhaps as a consequence, Congress initially financed the war at least in part
through extensive issues of paper money (see Exhibit 3). The bills, known as “Continentals,”
were ostensibly backed by future tax revenues rather than gold or silver. From 1775 until 1780,
when the printing stopped, Congress had issued well over $200 million in paper currency,
triggering severe depreciation and bringing the phrase “not worth a Continental” into
common parlance (see Exhibits 4 and 5).14 The scientist and statesman Benjamin Franklin,
however, argued that the inflation was not such a bad thing: “The general Effect of the
Depreciation among the Inhabitants of the States, has been this, that it has operated as a
gradual Tax upon them. … Thus it has proved a Tax on Money, a kind of Property very difficult
to be taxed in any other Mode; and it has fallen more equally than many other Taxes, as those
People paid most who being richest had most Money passing thro’ their Hands.”15
Although issues of paper money covered a large portion of federal spending until 1780
(see Exhibits 3-6), the Continental Congress also financed the war through borrowing –
particularly from France, Spain, and Holland, but also from domestic creditors. Because
investors were naturally wary about loaning large sums to a new government, interest rates
rose as wartime borrowing accelerated.16
Like Congress, most states initially tried to avoid levying taxes, relying instead on paper
money to finance the war effort. As inflation rose, however, many states finally began
imposing higher taxes. In some cases, wartime taxes exceeded those collected under British
rule, provoking citizens to protest, evade payment, and even sometimes riot. Ultimately even
these higher taxes proved insufficient, forcing states to rely on extensive borrowing and, in
some cases, continued use of the printing press to finance the war.17
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Forging a Confederation
For the first two years of the war, the Continental Congress did not have a written
constitution. In November 1777, it finally completed the Articles of Confederation.
The Articles of Confederation aimed to create “a firm league of friendship” between
the states. It did not create a strong central government or give Congress clear power over
the states. But it did say the states were not allowed to discriminate against each other’s
citizens. Each state had one vote in Congress, and important bills needed 9 out of 13 votes
to pass. All 13 states had to agree to any amendments, or changes, to the Articles
themselves.
The Articles gave Congress some exclusive powers, such as declaring war and making
treaties. But the Articles did not give Congress the power to tax. Congress was supposed
to pay back the national debt with money collected from the states. Congress, however,
had no power to enforce this rule, or any other laws. The Articles did not create an
executive branch.
It took over three years for all thirteen states to ratify the Articles of Confederation. It
finally became official in early 1781. Later that year, the Battle of Yorktown sealed the
Americans’ victory in the war. American leaders then turned to the task of governing the
country.
Vocabulary:
Confederation - a political union or alliance between a
number of states
Internal affairs – matters in a state that affect only that
state
Accord – an official agreement
Unicameral – made up of a single chamber
Improvements – public works and infrastructure such as
roads and canals
Ratify – officially confirm
Sovereignty – the authority of a state to govern itself
Defrayed – paid
Key Terms:
Articles of Confederation
“Privileges and
immunities”
Interstate commerce
As early as 1775, a number of political leaders, including Benjamin Franklin, had suggested
that the authority of the Continental Congress should be grounded in a written constitution.
Lawmakers began working on such a document in June 1776, based on the general
understanding that the states would be left to manage their internal affairs while Congress
would handle foreign affairs. Several significant points of contention emerged during the
drafting process, however, including whether more populous states would have more votes
in Congress and whether slave populations would be counted when calculating each state’s
share of wartime expenses.
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As the summer of 1776 came to a close, the drafting process was largely put aside – in part
because several core issues remained contentious, but also because the military situation was
becoming increasingly dire.18 British forces seized control of New York City in September,
and the city became a stronghold for colonists loyal to Britain. General Washington fled with
his troops to Pennsylvania, but over the winter captured Trenton and Princeton in New
Jersey. In October 1777, the British took Philadelphia, the nation’s capital, but this victory
proved costly to the British in both money and lives as a result of their generals’ poor
coordination and George Washington’s clever maneuvering. Although Washington’s army
faced starvation conditions at Valley Forge in Pennsylvania that winter, the Americans’
strategic position had already begun to improve in October of 1777, when the American
General Horatio Gates succeeded in halting a British army descending from Canada in the
Battle of Saratoga.19
That same month, members of the Continental Congress resumed work on a governing
document. Worsening inflation as well as the potential for an alliance with France renewed
the desire for a formal accord to undergird and clarify Congress’s authority. Lawmakers
ultimately resolved their differences by agreeing that each state would have one vote in the
unicameral Congress, war expenses would be distributed based on the value of each state’s
land and improvements, and Congress would not manage state boundaries or western lands.
Representatives finally completed drafting the document, called the Articles of
Confederation, in mid-November 1777.20
As the war gradually turned in the Americans’ favor, individual states began ratifying the
Articles. Virginia moved first, approving the document near the close of 1777, and Maryland
completed the process as the last state to ratify in early 1781.21 Just seven months later, the
British Commander Lord Cornwallis found himself surrounded by American forces and their
newfound French allies, and he surrendered to General Washington at Yorktown, Virginia,
on October 19, 1781.22 Although the war was not yet officially over, it was now rapidly
winding down, and the victorious Americans increasingly turned their attention to matters
of domestic governance.
“A Firm League of Friendship”
The Articles of Confederation, which announced that each state “retains its sovereignty”
and that together the states would form “a firm league of friendship with each other,” vested
limited authority in a national Congress without creating either a chief executive or a
judiciary. Specifically, the Articles conferred upon Congress the authority to borrow as well
as the exclusive power to declare war, to enter into treaties and alliances, to settle disputes
between the states, to regulate weights and measures, and to oversee a national postal system.
Nowhere, however, did the Articles grant the national government superiority relative to the
states or the means to compel them to follow its laws.
Although the Articles placed relatively few restrictions on the states, there was a clear
attempt to prevent them from discriminating against each other’s citizens. The people of each
state, the document declared, “shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens
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in the several States; and … shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof….” Significantly, the Articles also left
virtually all control over both foreign and interstate commerce with the states, rather than
with Congress.
While permitting the various states to collect taxes and impose tariffs, and requiring the
federal government to honor its war debts, the Articles did not grant Congress the power to
levy taxes. Instead, according to the Articles, “All charges of war, and all other expenses that
shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States
in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied
by the several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State.”
Finally, in terms of representation, the Articles granted each state delegation one vote in
Congress and mandated that the members of each delegation (who could not hold office for
more than three years out of six) “shall be annually appointed in such manner as the
legislature of each State shall direct.” On important bills, nine votes out of thirteen would be
necessary for passage, and unanimous consent of the states would be required in order to
amend the Articles themselves.
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A “Critical Period”
In the ‘critical period’ of the 1780s, the U.S. faced serious economic and political
problems.
Some problems resulted from Congress’ limited power. Congress could not collect
taxes, and it could not force the states to help pay the national debt. As a result, Congress
often failed to make its payments. Meanwhile, the states often ignored other rules in the
Articles of Confederation and the Treaty of Paris (which ended the Revolutionary War).
For example, some states passed trade laws that discriminated against their neighbors.
Congress could do nothing to stop states from misbehaving. Some politicians tried to
change the Articles to give Congress more power. But all changes needed unanimous
support from the states. Often, a single state would block a needed change.
To make matters worse, an economic downturn struck in the mid-1780s. State
governments, as well as individual Americans, struggled to pay their debts.
Revolutionary War veterans were hard hit. During the war, they had often been paid in
debt certificates. Now Congress and the states could not make payments on the
certificates, leaving veterans unable to pay their own debts. Different states responded to
the debt problem in different ways:
 Rhode Island printed large amounts of paper money in 1786, which led to
inflation. Debtors were able to pay back their debts with nearly worthless
currency. James Madison, however, accused Rhode Island of violating the rights of
creditors.
 Massachusetts, meanwhile, offered debtors no relief. State courts began to seize
the property of western farmers who could not pay their debts. In response, a
Continental Army veteran named Daniel Shays led a rebellion to shut down the
courts.
Shays’ Rebellion was defeated in early 1787, but it disturbed many American leaders. It
seemed to represent everything wrong with the new Confederation. Even the hero of the
Revolution, George Washington, wrote that he was “mortified beyond expression” by
what was happening in the country.
Vocabulary:
Default (verb) – to fail to make payments (on a debt)
Specie – gold or silver
Beggar-thy-neighbor policy – a policy that helps one
state in a way that harms other states
Pension – half-pay offered to military veterans
Unanimous – complete agreement of all voting
members
Per capita GNP – the total value of everything produced
in an economy in one year, divided by population
At par – for face value
Moratorium – a temporary ban on an activity
Key Terms:
Coercive power
Robert Morris
Treaty of Paris
“Nationalist” politicians
“Rouge Island”
Economic downturn
Paper money
Certificates (as payment)
Shays’ Rebellion
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Although 1781 was a glorious year for the young United States, with the victory at
Yorktown and the ratification of the Articles of the Confederation, the struggle to establish a
viable nation had only just begun. Indeed, the new nation faced enormous challenges after
the war came to a close. One of Harvard’s student commencement speakers in 1787, John
Quincy Adams, declared that during this “critical period,” Americans found themselves
“groaning under the intolerable burden of … accumulated evils.”23 Similarly, John Jay of New
York had warned in a letter to George Washington the previous year, “Our affairs seem to
lead to some crisis, some revolution—something that I cannot foresee or conjecture. I am
uneasy and apprehensive; more so than during the war. … The case is now altered; we are
going and doing wrong….”24 Anxiety was in the air during this “critical period,” and with
good reason.
Congress’s Limited Power
One of the first major problems to become apparent, even before the war officially ended,
was the appallingly weak financial position of the new federal government. Congress had
accumulated $27 million in debt during the war.25 Yet under the Articles it was unable to
impose national taxes or force the states to provide funds. In 1781, Congress collected only
$422,000 of $5 million requested from the states, with no contribution at all from Georgia,
North or South Carolina, or Delaware.26 Two years later, after persistent attempts to put
Congress’s fiscal house in order, Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris asked to be
“dismissed” from his position, writing in frustration, “It can no longer be a doubt to Congress
that our public credit is gone.”27
Congress could not pay its expenses, or its debts, without reliable income. Soldiers
expecting payment for their wartime service were particularly alarmed, and several officers
in Newburgh, New York, even threatened mutiny until George Washington himself
intervened, delivering a moving speech to his officer corps in defense of the republic.
Although a frightened Congress temporarily calmed the waters by enacting an expansive
military pension in 1783, Pennsylvania soldiers who were tired of waiting for compensation
literally ran Congress out of Philadelphia later that same year.28 Lacking funds well into the
decade, Congress repeatedly defaulted on its debt obligations, both foreign and domestic.29
At the urging of anxious creditors, Congress began transferring some of its debt burden into
the more capable hands of the states. Several states had already been contributing to cover a
portion of the debt since 1780, and many state leaders viewed the assumption of the national
debt as an expression of the “right to take care of [their] subjects.”30 By the middle of the
decade, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York alone had assumed $9 million dollars of the
national debt. Because states had the authority to tax their citizens, most were more successful
at managing this debt than Congress had been. Congress did resume some interest payments
in 1784, but paid creditors in new certificates rather than specie (i.e., gold or silver). These
certificates—essentially a replacement of new debt for old—were naturally unpopular with
recipients and quickly depreciated in value.31
Congress’s weakness under the Articles was also evident in its inability to enforce the
terms of the Treaty of Paris, the peace agreement between Britain and the United States that
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officially brought the war to a close in September 1783.32 With Congress lacking any real
coercive power, the states defied important provisions of the treaty designed to protect
loyalists from abuse and ensure payment of private debts to British creditors. Furious about
these blatant violations, the British retaliated by keeping troops garrisoned in frontier forts on
American soil, also in clear contravention of the treaty.33
Beyond treaty violations, the states frequently flouted the Articles of Confederation – for
example, by enacting laws that discriminated against out-of-state merchants. As a case in
point, New York laid heavy duties on New Jersey and Connecticut merchants who shipped
their products to New York City, provoking retaliatory sanctions from the affected states.34 In
fact, numerous states had begun imposing tariffs on their neighbors, dramatically impeding
interstate commerce.35
Beggar-thy-neighbor policies at the state level also sharply limited American effectiveness
in negotiations over international trade. Because Congress lacked the power to impose tariffs
and thus to retaliate against trade protection, it lacked the necessary bargaining power to
negotiate a reasonable trade treaty with a foreign power. In fact, the British Government
simply refused to negotiate with Congress at all, recognizing early on that Congress was
virtually powerless and that the various states could easily be played off against one another.
The result was that British goods poured into the states while American exports to Britain
remained severely depressed by pre-war standards (see Exhibit 8). American commercial
interests actively looked for alternative markets, particularly in Continental Europe, but they
faced the same obstacles again and again. As John Adams, the American liaison to Great
Britain (and John Quincy Adams’s father), struggled to respond to Britain’s aggressive
posture, he fretted that a sound commercial standing for the United States would “never be
secured until Congress shall be made supreme in foreign commerce.”36
Immediately after the war, several “nationalist” politicians who worried about the
consequences of an enfeebled Congress had suggested enhanced powers for the national
government. In his role as Finance Superintendent, for example, Robert Morris of
Pennsylvania proposed several amendments to the Articles that would have authorized
national taxes, and James Madison of Virginia supported an amendment to grant Congress
the power “to employ the force of the United States as well by sea as by land” to ensure
compliance with national laws.37 Such proposals, however, consistently failed to win the
unanimous consent of the states that was required to amend the Articles (Rhode Island,
sometimes referred to as “Rogue Island,” was a frequent dissenter), and the nationalists’
energy soon faded after 1783, at least temporarily.38
Other critics of Congress, meanwhile, harbored even more radical ideas for restoring order.
In the middle of the military pension dispute, Colonel Lewis Nicola wrote to George
Washington about the officers’ grievances. Most famously, he suggested that an American
monarchy be erected with Washington as king. Washington responded that if Nicola had
“any regard for your Country, concern for yourself or posterity—or respect for me, to banish
these thoughts from your Mind & never communicate, as from yourself, or any one else, a
sentiment of the like nature.”39
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Recession and Rebellion
Amidst such political turmoil – and perhaps in part because of it – the American economy
soon took a turn for the worse. Historians continue to debate the extent of the economic
downturn in the mid-1780s, but nearly all agree that it was a difficult period and some believe
that the downturn may have been extremely sharp. The most pessimistic estimates suggest
that per capita GNP fell by more than half. If so, then the economic collapse in the mid-1780s
was even worse than that experienced between 1929 and 1933 (the worst phase of the Great
Depression). According to two scholars of the period, “While the extent of the reduction in
gross national product remains uncertain, it is clear that per capita product fell and that it fell
enough to affect all levels of society.”40
One consequence of the downturn is that many individual debtors found it difficult to
make good on their obligations. Their woes were only compounded by the fact that the federal
government, as well as a number of states, had fallen behind on servicing their own debts,
leaving many former soldiers who had accepted bonds and certificates as payment for their
wartime service in a tough financial squeeze. Many of these former soldiers had no choice but
to sell their government certificates to speculators at deep discounts. In Massachusetts, for
example, a farmer who had served in the Revolutionary War complained in a local newspaper
that neither vendors nor workers would accept the government notes at par. “[T]he
necessities of my family,” he lamented, “obligated me to alienate [the notes] at one quarter
part of their original value.”41 Adding to the burden, many state governments raised taxes to
pay off war debts, pushing numerous taxpayers with heavy financial commitments of their
own to the breaking point.42
With countless farmers petitioning for debt relief, several state legislatures responded
around 1786 by issuing substantial amounts of paper money, thereby allowing debtors to
repay their debts in inflated currency. Rhode Island took the policy to its logical extreme,
inducing rapid inflation and imposing penalties on creditors who refused to accept payment
in the sharply depreciated paper money. Within a year, Rhode Island’s paper dollar was
worth only 16 cents in gold.43 Although other states exercised more restraint, creditors across
the country claimed that their property was being confiscated as a result of the inflationary
policies.44 In Virginia, James Madison warned that paper money “affects the Rights of
property as much as taking away equal value in land.”45
In contrast to Rhode Island, neighboring Massachusetts remained committed to both fiscal
and monetary conservatism. The state legislature raised taxes to repay its debts and resolutely
avoided a policy of inflation. The resulting pressure on small farmers was enormous, and
many lost their property in court-ordered foreclosures. One former Revolutionary officer,
Daniel Shays, was so angry about the plight of farmers in the state that, starting in the late
summer of 1786, he helped to lead a growing rebellion in western Massachusetts, its ranks
eventually surging to over 2,000 men. One goal of the rebels was to prevent the courts –
through either force or intimidation – from seizing the delinquent farmers’ property.
Although rumors circulated that the rebels intended to unseat the state government, nothing
of the sort ever happened and the uprising was ultimately put down in early 1787. There is
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little doubt, however, that the newly elected legislature in Massachusetts heard Shays’
message, for they quickly passed a variety of relief measures including a moratorium on
debts.46
In the minds of many Americans, moreover, the crisis in Massachusetts epitomized all that
was wrong with the new Confederation. Economic elites who had never been very
comfortable with the idea of broad-based democracy wondered whether they were headed
for a future of class warfare and even mob rule. George Washington saw the whole episode
as a terrible embarrassment: “To be more exposed in the eyes of the world & more
contemptible than we already are, is hardly possible,” he lamented.47 Particularly after the
nation’s extraordinary triumph over the British, what could explain its shocking fall from
grace in the eyes of so many Americans, including the hero of the Revolution himself?
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Madison’s Diagnosis
James Madison, a young politician from Virginia, was determined to figure out what
had gone wrong in the United States. In 1786, he turned to history of confederacies to
learn what made each of them succeed or fail. Then he applied his new knowledge to the
United States. In 1787, he summed up his findings in “Vices of the Political System of the
United States.”
In “Vices,” Madison pointed out several flaws in the Articles of Confederation. A
major flaw was that Congress was not given the power to enforce its laws on the states.
Meanwhile, the states did not cooperate well and often passed laws that hurt the nation in
general.
Madison wanted to know why states often passed unjust laws. Here, the idea of
“faction” was central to his thinking. To Madison, a faction was any group with shared
interests, such as an economic class or a political party. In a republic, factions were always
competing for control. But if a single faction ever won a majority in a legislature, it would
pass laws that hurt everyone else. Madison believed this tyranny of the majority was
more likely in a small republic than in a large one. In a large republic, there would be
more factions and therefore more competition. In theory, the factions would balance each
other out. As a result, a legislature in a large republic would likely make better, fairer
laws.
Madison’s faith in large republics led him to suggest major changes to the political
system. He wanted the central government to be more powerful than the state
governments. He also wanted to see Congress take sole control over more areas, such as
trade laws. As part of his plan, he proposed a “federal negative,” or the power for
Congress to veto any state law.
Yet all of Madison’s suggestions went against the core ideas of the Articles of
Confederation. It would not be enough to amend them. The whole document would have
to be replaced.
Vocabulary:
Penchant – a talent or knack
Deficiencies – problems or shortcomings
Prerogative - power or right
Dissolution – complete breakdown
Inherent – existing in something as permanent or
essential
Sanction – a penalty (for breaking a law)
Coercion – the use force or threats to persuade someone
to do something
Subordinate – secondary or lower-ranking; subject to
control by something else
Delinquent – failing in one’s duty (to pay, for example)
Veto – the act of rejecting a proposed law
Key Terms:
Virginia Anglican Church
State legislatures
Faction
Small vs. large republics
Tyranny of the majority
“Enlargement of the sphere”
Federal negative
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This question of what had gone wrong captivated James Madison, a Virginia statesman
who had been active in both national and state politics throughout the revolutionary and
postwar eras. Born in 1751 into an affluent slaveholding family,b Madison has been described
as possessing “a keen and inquiring mind coupled with a voracious intellectual appetite.”48
He attended the College of New Jersey, which later became Princeton University, and went
on to study with its president, John Witherspoon.
Although physically diminutive and reserved in personality, Madison had a penchant for
politics and political battles. Frustrated upon returning from New Jersey in the early 1770s
that his own Virginia Anglican Church was a source of intolerance against other
denominations, he furiously denounced its “diabolical, hell-conceived principle of
persecution.”49 Not long afterward, as the rebellion against Britain took hold, Madison began
to assist county and state governments, and at the age of 25 helped to write Virginia’s state
constitution.50 Elected to the Continental Congress in 1780, Madison had borne witness to its
various deficiencies, and he was disappointed when his nationalist projects failed to take
hold. After rejoining the Virginia legislature in 1784, he and his allies successfully defeated
proposals both to declare Christianity the state religion and to expand issuances of paper
money. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these movements likely contributed to his
growing unease about the direction of American politics.51
In March 1784, Madison asked his friend Thomas Jefferson, then in Paris on a diplomatic
mission, to send him whatever books “may throw light on the general Constitution & droit
public [public law] of the several confederacies which have existed.”52 Madison reasoned that
by understanding why past confederations had succeeded or failed, he could better identify
what ailed the American confederation. By January 1786, he had received two trunks of books
in English, French, and Latin at Montpelier, his family’s plantation estate.53 Sitting in his
library, Madison began working through the books, conducting a thorough historical review
spanning thousands of years. The lessons he gleaned would shape his thinking on the young
American republic as well as his arguments at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
the following year.
History as a Guide
The books on Madison’s reading list included, among others, recent French works in the
Enlightenment philosophe tradition and numerous classical Greek texts.54 The confederations
he surveyed ranged from the Amphyctionic and Achaean confederacies of ancient Greece to
the Belgic confederacy in the Netherlands (also known as the United Netherlands), which was
still in place in the 1780s.
Madison took careful notes on each confederation’s structure and operations, specifically
commenting on the deficiencies he perceived in each. He noted that several confederation
governments had been unable to control their members, even in policy areas where they held

b Although Madison would later speak out against slavery, he never freed his own slaves. Significantly, he also wrote a precursor
to the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise as a proposed amendment to the Articles of Confederation, though the provision was
not adopted.
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explicit authority. For example, he pointed out that Athens and Sparta had waged their many
wars against each other while co-members of the Amphyctionic confederacy, despite the
federal authority’s prerogative to mediate such conflicts.55 The central authority of the Belgic
confederacy, meanwhile, had to consult 52 different cities—and sometimes procure their
unanimous consent—when negotiating any treaty, causing long delays and easy
manipulation by foreign powers. With each member city able to hold up the whole, the
confederacy proved exceedingly slow in enacting policies. Madison believed that such “[a]
weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution for want of proper powers.”56
“Vices of the Political System of the United States”
Having completed his historical investigation of confederations from around the world,
Madison began preparing a critique of the new confederation in America. The resulting 1787
document, entitled “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” identified a range of
national failings and attributed them to deficiencies “radically and permanently inherent in
… the present System.”57
He began by highlighting the states’ persistent violations of the Articles of Confederation,
such as their breaches of international treaties and their regular refusal to honor Congress’s
requests for funds. Although Madison criticized the states for these actions, he mainly faulted
the Articles for denying the national government the capacity to enforce its policies. The
authors of the Articles, he wrote, had trusted too much “that the justice, the good faith, the
honor, [and] the sound policy”58 of the state legislatures would obviate the need for such
enforcement power at the federal level. “A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion
is to that of Government,” he explained, and without either he believed the existing system
had little to recommend it.59
Even the state legislatures’ constitutional actions, Madison lamented, had often undercut
the national interest. He complained that the states had regularly failed to pursue “concert in
matters where public interest require[d] it,” particularly in setting uniform commercial
policies.60 Instead, they had passed laws to limit interstate trade or to support debtors at the
expense of out-of-state creditors, which pit states and citizens against each other in a manner
Madison called “destructive of the general harmony.”61
In the final section of "Vices," Madison went beyond merely listing the country’s problems
and proposed an explanation as to why there had been so much “injustice” in the states’ laws
(see Appendix).62 In doing so, he rejected the traditional assumption – perhaps most strongly
associated with Montesquieu and his studies of the ancient Greek republics – that republican
government worked best on a small scale.63 Madison began by observing that all communities
contained various factions such as economic classes, religious groups, and political parties. If
a single faction, or a small concert of factions, won control of a legislature, “what [was] to
restrain them from unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of
individuals?” Madison suggested that small republics, with less competition among political
groups, were more vulnerable to this problem of tyranny of the majority. In large republics,
by contrast, “[t]he Society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits, of
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passions, which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less
opportunity of communication and concert.” With diverse factions tempering each other’s
influence, he suggested, a larger republic’s legislature would enact sounder and fairer
policies.
Implicit throughout “Vices” was Madison’s longing for constitutional reforms that would
strengthen the national government and expand its influence over the states. He clearly
articulated his desire to grant Congress powers of “sanction” and “coercion.”64 But his
frustrations about the states’ failure to work together implied that the federal government
required not only greater enforcement power, but also a broader span of authority. Notably,
he wished to see an “enlargement of the sphere” of democratic policymaking to weaken the
influence of faction, implying a shift in power from the state to the national level.65 Such
changes would be impossible under the current system, however, because the states’
“sovereignty, freedom, and independence” were enshrined in the Articles of Confederation.66
Madison thus intimated that only fundamental changes to the nation’s constitution—or
perhaps a completely new one—would be sufficient to correct the republic’s flaws.
Vision for a New Constitution
By the time he completed “Vices,” Madison had begun describing potential constitutional
reforms in his correspondence with other national leaders.67 Together, these proposals
comprised a program that would “lead to such a systematic change” in American governance,
he wrote, that it would replace, rather than merely alter, the Articles of Confederation.68
Madison’s proposed system would be built on “a due supremacy of the national authority”
and would leave the states with enough power to be “subordinately useful.”69 To that end, he
sought to grant the national government “positive and compleat authority in all cases which
require uniformity,” such as the setting of trade regulations and customs rates.70 This federal
supremacy would extend to new judicial and executive branches of the national government,
each superior to the analogous state institutions. To further bolster the national government’s
authority, Madison proposed a “right of coercion” against delinquent states that would
enable the federal government to carry out its laws “by force.”71
As a further check on the states, Madison proposed that Congress hold a veto over state
laws “in all cases whatsoever.”72 He explained his reasoning in a letter to Jefferson:
The effects of this provision would be not only to guard the national rights and
interests against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and
molesting each other, and even from oppressing the minority within themselves
by paper money and other unrighteous measures which favor the interest of the
majority.73
Madison believed that this veto, which scholars call the “federal negative,” was essential
to Congress’s supremacy under his model.74 “Without this defensive power,” he warned,
“every positive power that can be given on paper will be evaded & defeated.”75
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In addition to suggesting new powers for Congress, Madison also recommended
modifications to its structure and mechanisms of representation. His proposal would split the
existing unitary Congress into two houses: one elected by the people or state legislatures and
another “to consist of a more select number, holding their appointments for a longer term.”76
Within those houses, Madison desired a “change [to] be made in the principle of
representation” to foster greater equality between the states.77 Although each state was
nominally equal in Congress under the Articles’ one-state-one-vote system, the larger states
had always enjoyed more clout in national affairs due to their legislatures’ greater “weight
and influence.”78 Madison hoped to see these inequalities reduced “under a system…which
would operate without the intervention of the State legislatures.”79
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The Constitutional Convention of 1787
In 1787, Congress called for a convention in Philadelphia to revise the Articles of
Confederation. James Madison became a leading voice in the debates. The “Virginia
Plan,” which contained many of his ideas, offered an outline for a new constitution.
After some debate, the Convention agreed to many of Madison’s main ideas. The new
national government would be supreme, or more powerful, than the state governments. It
would also be divided into three branches: legislative (to write laws), executive (to
enforce laws), and judicial (to interpret laws). Congress, meanwhile, would be divided
into an upper and lower house. Congress would have wider power, too. The convention
agreed to list specific powers later. But in general, the powers would apply to all cases
where states were “individually incompetent.”
On June 8, the convention debated Madison’s “federal negative,” or the power of
Congress to veto state laws. The convention had already agreed to a limited form of the
idea. In the limited form, Congress could veto state laws only if they went against the
constitution. But now Charles Pinckney of South Carolina brought back Madison’s
original idea. He suggested giving Congress the power to veto any state law. In
Pinckney’s view, only absolute veto power would enable Congress to enforce its laws.
Madison supported the idea, but others disagreed. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
said an absolute federal negative would allow Congress to “enslave the states.” Gunning
Bedford of Delaware worried that it would help large states to “crush the small ones.” At
last, the matter came to a vote.
Vocabulary:
Consensus – widespread agreement
Convention – a formal meeting held for a
political purpose
Bicameral – made up of two chambers
(often used to describe legislatures)
Proportional representation – basing the
number of seats in a legislature on
population size
Incompetent – unable to perform
Enumerating – giving a specific list
Absolute – applying in all cases; total
Key Terms:
Annapolis Convention
Virginia Plan
Elbridge Gerry
The Senate
Unitary executive
National supremacy
Absolute vs. Limited Federal Negative
An emerging national “consensus” for constitutional reform would soon give Madison the
chance to present his ideas on a national stage.80 In 1785, as the individual states struggled
against Britain’s trade laws, support had grown for an amendment to the Articles of
Confederation that would grant Congress new powers over international trade. At Madison’s
recommendation, a convention met the following September in Annapolis to discuss such an
amendment, but only five states sent representatives who arrived in time to participate.81
Although the conference remained brief because of sparse attendance, the conferees
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suggested that another meeting be held the next year to discuss a wider array of constitutional
issues. Congress sat on this recommendation for months. Some observers say that it was
ultimately propelled to action only by fears of general unrest stemming from Shays’ Rebellion.
Whatever the cause, Congress in February 1787 formally called for a new convention in
Philadelphia “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.”82
Madison was one of 55 delegates who attended the Convention that began on May 25.
George Washington presided over the Convention, and every state except Rhode Island sent
a delegation. Seated in a central location from which he could easily hear all members and
take detailed notes, Madison was a leading contributor to the discussions.83 Throughout the
debates, he shared the theories he had derived from his extensive study of republics and
confederacies, and peppered the debate with arguments he had rehearsed in “Vices of the
Political System.” Georgia delegate William Pierce described Madison as “blend[ing] together
the profound politician, with the Scholar… the best informed Man of any point in debate.”84
Madison’s outsized influence over the Convention was further enhanced by his Virginia
delegation, which presented a preliminary outline for the new constitution, inspired heavily
by Madison’s own recommendations. The “Virginia Plan,” as it became known, dominated
early discussions at the Convention.
The Structure of the New Government under the Virginia Plan
The Virginia Plan included Madison’s proposal for a bicameral Congress, specifying that
the American people would elect representatives to the lower house, who in turn would select
members of the upper house from candidates nominated by the state legislatures. State
representation in Congress would be “proportioned to the Quotas of contribution [taxes], or
to the number of free inhabitants.”85 The delegates quickly agreed to the bicameral structure,
but remained at odds over how to select the members of each house.86
Some delegates worried about giving the people too much power. According to Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts, the United States already suffered from an “excess of democracy.”
The people of his home state, he asserted, had been “misled into the most baneful measures
and opinions” by “pretended patriots,” and these episodes had convinced him of the dangers
of too much democracy.87 Agreeing that the people were unqualified to choose their
congressmen, South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney proposed that the selection of the lower
house be left to the state legislatures instead.88
Supporters of a popularly elected house, meanwhile, were quick to invoke democratic
ideals in its defense. It was only just, Virginia’s George Mason argued, that “every class of the
people” be represented in the government.89 Madison, responding to Pinckney’s proposal,
spoke at length on his theory of faction and the virtues of a large republic. He repeated the
criticisms of faction-prone state legislatures that he had developed in “Vices.” Keeping state
politics out of the lower house of Congress, he maintained, would “enlarge the sphere,”
ensuring a greater variety of interests.90 Ultimately, Madison and his allies prevailed on this
issue: Pinckney’s proposal was rejected, and control over selecting the lower house was
placed in the people’s hands.
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The Senate (as the conferees called the upper house) would be built on less democratic
principles. Many delegates envisioned the Senate as the more careful and deliberative house,
containing “the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their
weight of property.”91 Madison predicted that the Senate, given its makeup, would stand as
a vital bulwark against tyranny of the majority, even as American society evolved and (in his
estimation) the proportion of poor laborers increased over time:
In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd not lose sight of the
changes which ages will produce. An increase in population will of necessity
increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, &
secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of the blessings. These may in time
outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to
the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No
agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a
leveling spirit … have sufficiently appeared … to give notice of the future danger.
How is this danger to be guarded agst on republican principles? How is the
danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded
agst? Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Govt
sufficiently
respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergences, the
preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into the scale.92
Although the delegates largely agreed on the desired character of the Senate, there was
considerable debate over how members of the upper house should be selected. Mirroring
Pinckney’s earlier idea for the lower house, John Dickenson of Delaware suggested that the
state legislatures should select their senators, asserting that “[t]he preservation of the States
in a certain agency is indispensable.”93 He hoped that the Senate, selected in this way, would
be a body through which the states could exert an additional check on federal power. Madison
opposed Dickenson’s suggestion because he preferred a small Senate comprised of just a few
elite leaders. Under Dickenson’s proposal, the smallest states would each have at least one
senator and, because Madison and his Virginia colleagues favored proportional
representation, larger states would require proportionally larger numbers of senators, as in
the lower house.94 The Virginia Plan had ingeniously avoided this problem by granting
election of the Senate to the lower house. In this way, votes for senators would be
proportionally distributed among the states, while the final number of senators selected could
remain small. Although Madison attempted to rally support for his model by reminding
listeners of the state legislatures’ role in the paper money crises, the delegates ultimately
endorsed Dickenson’s method of selection instead.95
Beyond the bicameral legislature, the Virginia Plan also included a new national executive
branch with “a general authority to execute the National laws.” When James Wilson of
Pennsylvania moved that the executive be vested in one person, rather than a small council,
there was “a considerable pause” in the discussion. Americans had been ruled by one man
before, the King of England, and there was concern that Wilson’s proposal might prove to be
“the fœtus of monarchy.”96 Wilson countered that a council would involve “nothing but
uncontrouled, continued, & violent animosities,” whereas a unitary executive would be
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steadier and more decisive. Wilson also reassured the Convention that the executive’s powers
would be sufficiently limited that he could never rule like a king; instead, he would more
closely resemble the governors to whom Americans had already entrusted their state
operations.97 In the end, the assembly agreed with Wilson that a single executive would be
best, in part because nearly all assumed that George Washington, whom they admired and
trusted, would become the first president.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts next recommended granting the executive veto power
over laws passed by Congress. The Virginia Plan would have conferred this power to a
“Council of Revision” made up of the executive and members of the judicial branch, but Gerry
wished to separate the judiciary from the laws it would be asked to rule upon. Delegates had
already expressed anxiety about the creation of a single executive, and the prospect of
empowering it still further immediately provoked opposition. As a matter of democratic
principle, critics resisted “enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole.”98 They also
feared that veto power would, in practice, give the executive nearly absolute control over the
entire government.99 This issue, like so many others, was ultimately settled through
compromise: the executive would have veto power, but two-thirds votes in both houses of
Congress could override it.
National Supremacy?
As the delegates gradually worked out the structure of the new federal government, they
also had to decide on its role vis-à-vis the states. Indeed, one of the first general principles
voted on was “that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.” Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania “explained the
distinction between a federal and national, supreme government; the former being a mere
compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a complete and compulsive
operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one supreme power, and one
only.”100 Perhaps not surprisingly, some delegates wondered if the notion of national
supremacy over the states went too far. Pinckney even questioned whether this new dynamic
was intended to “abolish the State Governments altogether,” though Edmund Randolph, the
leading presenter of the Virginia Plan, assured him that it was not.101 After relatively brief
deliberation on the issue, the convention voted to endorse the supremacy provision.
A closely related issue was how to draw a dividing line between the powers of Congress
and those of the states. The Virginia Plan proposed that Congress have “Legislative power in
all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent.” Some delegates,
however, worried this language was excessively vague. To combat concerns that the
convention was “running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States,”102 many
delegates believed that Congress’s authority should be limited by specifically enumerating its
powers. Madison largely agreed with them, but made clear that in any future discussions of
such powers “he would shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form
of Government as would provide for the safety, liberty, and happiness of the community.”103
With the understanding that specifics might be discussed at a later date, the convention voted
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at the end of May in favor of the Virginia Plan’s language on Congress, empowering it to act
where the states “were individually incompetent.”
The Federal Negative
Madison’s proposal for a Congressional veto over state laws – his “federal negative” –
finally took center stage at the Convention on June 8. While his original proposal would have
applied in “all cases whatsoever,” Madison’s Virginia colleagues had included a narrower
version in the Virginia Plan that limited Congress’s veto only to state laws “contravening in
the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.” The Convention had assented
to this more limited federal negative early on and without argument.104 On June 8th, however,
Pinckney suggested extending the veto to “all laws which [Congress] should judge to be
improper,” in line with Madison’s original conception. Pinckney doubted that the Virginia
Plan’s more limited approach would be sufficient to keep the states in line and that “a
universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual.” He judged the
absolute approach that he was proposing to be “the corner stone of an efficient national
Government,” without which Congress would prove unable to enforce its policies.105
Madison seconded Pinckney’s motion. He warned that a limited federal negative,
intended to nullify only unconstitutional state laws, was liable to become “a fresh source of
contention” between the states and the federal government, as they battled over the question
of constitutionality. Perhaps most troubling, while such disagreements might necessitate
that Congress impose its decisions by force, Madison questioned whether such federal
coercion would be feasible:
Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost, enforce a national decree
against Massachusetts, abetted, perhaps, by several of her neighbours? It would
not be possible. A small proportion of the community, in a compact situation,
acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremities, might at any time bid
defiance to the national authority.106
Fortunately, Madison predicted, an absolute federal negative would eliminate such
potentially violent disagreements. “The negative would render the use of force unnecessary,”
he declared. “The States could of themselves pass no operative act, any more than one branch
of a legislature, where there are two branches, can proceed without the other. But in order to
give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases.”107
Wilson joined Pinckney and Madison in supporting the absolute federal negative, stressing
that excessive state independence threatened national unity. He reviewed the history of
American attitudes toward federalism, noting that an early confidence that the United States
would “bury all local interests & distinctions” had gradually dissolved under the “jealousy &
ambition” of the state governments. “Leave the whole at the mercy of each part,” he asked,
“and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?”108
Opponents of the absolute negative expressed horror at the thought of so explicitly
sacrificing the states’ control over their own affairs. Although Gerry of Massachusetts saw the
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usefulness of vetoing paper money laws, he feared that an absolute negative would allow
Congress to “enslave the states.”109
Delegates also argued that empowering the national government in this way would enable
interstate abuses rather than curtail them. Gerry suggested that the negative might dissuade
new states from joining the Union, and Delaware’s Gunning Bedford worried that the more
populous states, which would have greater influence in Congress, might use the negative to
impose their will on smaller states. He offered his own state as an illustration of the point:
under proportional representation, Pennsylvania and Virginia would together control onethird of Congress, while Delaware would control just one-ninetieth. “Will not these large
States crush the small ones [with the negative]” he asked, “whenever they stand in the way
of their ambitious or interested views?”110
With both sides having made their case, the proposal was finally put to a vote at the end
of the day’s session on June 8, 1787. Whether Madison’s notion of an absolute federal veto
over state laws would live or die was now up to the 55 delegates who together comprised the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.
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Exhibit 1 Estimated Population of American Colonies and States, 1650-1780
Colony/State 1780 1770 1760 1750 1700 1650
New Hampshire 87,802 62,396 39,093 27,505 4,958 1,305
Massachusetts 268,627 235,308 202,600 188,000 55,941 16,603
Rhode Island 52,946 58,196 45,471 33,226 5,894 785
Connecticut 206,701 183,881 142,470 111,280 25,970 4,139
New York 210,541 162,920 117,138 76,696 19,107 4,116
New Jersey 139,627 117,431 93,813 71,393 14,010
Pennsylvania 327,305 240,057 183,703 119,666 17,950
Delaware 45,385 35,496 33,250 28,704 2,470 185
Maryland 247,959 202,599 162,267 141,073 29,604 4,504
Virginia 538,004 447,016 339,726 236,681 58,560 18,731
North Carolina 270,133 197,200 110,442 72,984 10,720
South Carolina 180,000 124,244 94,074 74,000 6,260
Georgia 56,071 23,375 9,578 5,200

TOTAL 2,631,101 2,090,119 1,573,625 1,186,408 251,444 50,368
Source: Adapted from Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online, eds. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund
Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (Cambridge University Press, 2006),
Series Eg 1-20 [hsus.cambridge.org].
Note: Massachusetts figures include Plymouth colony and Maine.
Exhibit 2 Tax Collections in the American Colonies under the British Revenue Laws, 1765-1774
(pounds sterling)
Year
Total of
1760s Acts
Sugar Act
(1764, 1766)
Stamp Act
(1765)
Townshend Act
(1767)
Navigation
Act (1673)
1765 17,383 14,091 3,292 2,954
1766 26,696 26,696 7,373
1767 34,041 33,844 197 3,905
1768 37,861 24,659 13,202 1,160
1769 45,499 39,938 5,561 1,294
1770 33,637 30,910 2,727 1,828
1771 31,761 27,086 4,675 1,446
1772 45,870 42,570 3,300 1,490
1773 42,103 39,531 2,572 2,517
1774 27,995 27,074 921 672
Source: Adapted from Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Eg 420-424.
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Exhibit 3 Funding the War for Independence (millions of pounds sterling, estimated)
Source Funds
Continental paper money 46
State paper money 64
Congressional domestic bonds 6
Congressional debt certificates 16
Foreign loans to Congress 10
State debt 23
Source: Adapted from Arthur H. Reede, The Financing of the American Revolution (Fairport, NY: Rochester Press, 1996), p. 103.
Exhibit 4 Continental Paper Money Emitted
Year Currency emitted Value in Gold
1775 $6,000,000 $6,000,000
1776 $19,000,000 $17,300,000
1777 $13,000,000 $4,530,000
1778 $63,400,000 $11,695,000
1779 $124,800,000 $5,964,000
1780 & 1781 $1,592,222
Source: Adapted from E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 30;
and Reede, The Financing of the American Revolution, p. 324. The depreciated values for 1780 and 1781 are unavailable;
Reede notes that these years technically saw the issue of a new currency intended to replace the old.
Exhibit 5 Continental Currency Required to Buy $1 Specie (gold)
Month Price
January 1777 $1.25
July 1777 $3.00
January 1778 $4.00
July 1778 $4.00
January 1779 $8.00
July 1779 $19.00
October 1779 $30.00
January 1780 $42.50
July 1780 $62.50
January 1781 $100.00
April 1781 $167.50
Source: Adapted from Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, p. 32. These conversion rates are for “old” Continental currency, issued
before 1780.
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Exhibit 6 Congressional Spending (excluding foreign expenditures and expansion of floating debt),
1775-1781
Year
Spending
(Continental currency) Specie (Gold) Value
1775-1776 $20,064,666 $20,064,666
1777 $26,426,333 $24,986,646
1778 $66,965,269 $24,289,438
1779 $149,703,856 $10,794,620
1780 $83,799,556 $3,000,000
1781 $13,654,983 $1,942,465
Source: Adapted from Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, pp. 28-29. Some, but not all, of the spending was funded through
currency emissions. The “Continental currency” values reflect mainly “old” Continental currency, issued before 1780.
Congress issued a relatively small amount of new currency in 1780 and 1781, which traded at a more favorable
conversion rate relative to gold.
Exhibit 7 Congress’s Payments To, and Receipts From, the States during the War of Independence,
expressed in specie (gold) value
State Paid to state Received from state
New Hampshire $440,974 $466,544
Massachusetts $1,245,737 $3,167,020
Rhode Island $1,028,511 $310,395
Connecticut $1,016,273 $1,607,295
New York $822,803 $1,545,889
New Jersey $366,729 $512,916
Pennsylvania $2,087,276 $2,629,410
Delaware $63,817 $208,878
Maryland $609,617 $945,537
Virginia $482,881 $1,963,811
North Carolina $788,031 $219,835
South Carolina $1,014,808 $499,325
Georgia $679,412 $122,744
Source: Robert A. Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance, 1775-1787,” in Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (eds.), A Companion
to the American Revolution (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 394.
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Exhibit 8 American Exports and Imports, with England, 1700-1786 (pounds sterling)
Year Exports Imports
1700 395,021 344,341
1710 249,814 293,659
1720 468,188 319,702
1730 572,585 536,860
1740 718,416 813,382
1750 814,768 1,313,083
1760 761,099 2,611,764
1770 1,015,535 1,925,571
1771 1,339,840 4,202,472
1772 1,258,515 3,012,635
1773 1,369,229 2,079,412
1774 1,373,846 2,590,437
1775 1,920,950 196,162
1776 103,964 55,415
1777 12,619 57,295
1778 17,694 33,986
1779 20,579 349,797
1780 18,560 825,431
1781 99,847 847,883
1782 28,676 256,325
1783 314,058 1,435,229
1784 701,190 3,418,407
1785 775,892 2,078,744
1786 743,644 1,431,255
Source: Adapted from Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Eg 429 and 436.
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Appendix
Excerpt from James Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United
States” (April 1787)
[Section] 11. Injustice of the laws of the States
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove a want of wisdom, their injustice betrays a
defect still more alarming: more alarming not merely because it is a greater evil in itself, but
because it brings more into question the fundamental principle of republican Government,
that the majority who rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians both of public Good
and of private rights. To what causes is this evil to be ascribed?
These causes lie

1. in the Representative bodies.
2. in the people themselves.
3. Representative appointments are sought from 3 motives. 1. ambition 2. personal interest.
4. public good. Unhappily the two first are proved by experience to be most prevalent. Hence
   the candidates who feel them, particularly, the second, are most industrious, and most
   successful in pursuing their object: and forming often a majority in the legislative Councils,
   with interested views, contrary to the interest, and views, of their Constituents, join in a
   perfidious sacrifice of the latter to the former. A succeeding election it might be supposed,
   would displace the offenders, and repair the mischief. But how easily are base and selfish
   measures, masked by pretexts of public good and apparent expediency? How frequently will
   a repetition of the same arts and industry which succeeded in the first instance, again prevail
   on the unwary to misplace their confidence?
   How frequently too will the honest but unenlightened representative be the dupe of a
   favorite leader, veiling his selfish views under the professions of public good, and varnishing
   his sophistical arguments with the glowing colours of popular eloquence?
5. A still more fatal if not more frequent cause lies among the people themselves. All
   civilized societies are divided into different interests and factions, as they happen to be
   creditors or debtors—Rich or poor—husbandmen, merchants or manufacturers—members of
   different religious sects—followers of different political leaders—inhabitants of different
   districts—owners of different kinds of property &c &c. In republican Government the
   majority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent
   interest or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations
   of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals? Three motives only 1. a prudent
   regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the Community.
   This consideration although of decisive weight in itself, is found by experience to be too often
   unheeded. It is too often forgotten, by nations as well as by individuals that honesty is the
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best policy. 2dly. respect for character. However strong this motive may be in individuals, it
is considered as very insufficient to restrain them from injustice. In a multitude its efficacy is
diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame. Besides, as
it has reference to public opinion, which within a particular Society, is the opinion of the
majority, the standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be measured by it. The public
opinion without the Society, will be little respected by the people at large of any Country.
Individuals of extended views, and of national pride, may bring the public proceedings to
this standard, but the example will never be followed by the multitude. Is it to be imagined
that an ordinary citizen or even an assembly-man of R[hode] Island in estimating the policy
of paper money, ever considered or cared in what light the measure would be viewed in
France or Holland; or even in Massts or Connect.? It was a sufficient temptation to both that
it was for their interest: it was a sufficient sanction to the latter that it was popular in the State;
to the former that it was so in the neighbourhood. 3dly. will Religion the only remaining
motive be a sufficient restraint? It is not pretended to be such on men individually considered.
Will its effect be greater on them considered in an aggregate view? quite the reverse. The
conduct of every popular assembly acting on oath, the strongest of religious Ties, proves that
individuals join without remorse in acts, against which their consciences would revolt if
proposed to them under the like sanction, separately in their closets. When indeed Religion
is kindled into enthusiasm, its force like that of other passions, is increased by the sympathy
of a multitude. But enthusiasm is only a temporary state of religion, and while it lasts will
hardly be seen with pleasure at the helm of Government. Besides as religion in its coolest
state, is not infallible, it may become a motive to oppression as well as a restraint from
injustice. Place three individuals in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the
voice of the others, and give to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third? Will
the latter be secure? The prudence of every man would shun the danger. The rules & forms
of justice suppose & guard against it. Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to
encroach on the rights of one thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions
& oppressions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in
little republics when uncontrouled by apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of
the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of a
common interest or passion is less predominant in this case with the majority; but because a
common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be
formed by a great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken into a greater variety
of interests, of pursuits, of passions, which check each other, whilst those who may feel a
common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert. It may be inferred
that the inconveniences of popular States contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion
not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits.
The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the Sovereignty as will
render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to controul one part
of the Society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled
itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society. In absolute Monarchies,
the prince is sufficiently, neutral towards his subjects, but frequently sacrifices their happiness
to his ambition or his avarice. In small Republics, the sovereign will is sufficiently controuled
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from such a Sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts
composing it. As a limited Monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive
Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic.
An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a process of
elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest
characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to
pursue the end of their appointment, and be most capable to devise the proper means of
attaining it.
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Endnotes
1 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1984), p. 88 (June 8th,
1787). Although Madison himself does not appear to have used the phrase “federal negative,” he commonly used the word
“negative” in describing the proposal. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson on March 19, 1787, for example, he wrote that it was
necessary “to arm the federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local Legislatures.” Numerous historians have
subsequently referred to Madison’s proposal as the “federal negative.” See esp. Alison L. LaCroix, “The Authority for
Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology,” Law and History Review, May 2010, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 462
and 462n29).
2 James Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 89, 91.
3 George Washington, “To David Humphreys, 22 October 1786,” in Theodore J. Crackel (ed.), The Papers of George Washington
Digital Edition (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008).
4 Alice Hanson Jones, “Wealth Estimates for the American Middle Colonies, 1774,” Economic Development and Cultural Change,
1970, Vol. 18, No.4, pt. 2, p. 130.
5 John J. McCusker, “Population, by Race and by Colony or Locality: 1610–1780,” in Historical Statistics of the United States,
Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, ed. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L.
Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), series Eg1, Eg41; Russell
Thornton, “Population History of Native North Americans,” in A Population History of North America, ed. Michael R. Haines
and Richard H. Steckel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. 9–24 (see also table A.1, p. 694); Allan Kulikoff,
From British Peasants to Colonial American Farmers (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), esp. 3, 291. With
regard to the Native American population, Thornton emphasizes that estimates vary widely. According to one set of estimates
(presented in Haines and Steckel, Population History, table A.1), the Native American population north of the Rio Grande fell
from 1.15 million in 1650 to 780,000 in 1750. Although disease (especially smallpox) played a large role in the decline of the
Native American population, Thornton stresses that other factors associated with contact with the colonists, including violent
conflict, also played a significant role (see Thornton, “Population History,” 21–23).
6 Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 8-9.
7 The so-called French and Indian War was part of a larger global conflict known as the Seven Years War. The total cost of this
war to Britain was more than double its annual gross national product in 1760. See Nancy F. Koehn, The Power of Commerce:
Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 5.
8 Morgan, Birth of the Republic, pp. 16-19. See also, Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 160-175.
9 Quoted in Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986), p. 572.
10 Samuel Eliot Morison, Henry Steele Commager, and William E. Leuchtenburg, The Growth of the American Republic, Volume 1
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 209.
11 Several of the new constitutions were only slightly revised versions of existing colonial charters. See Donald S. Lutz, “State
Constitution-Making, Through 1781” in Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., A Companion to the American Revolution (Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2000), pp. 270-271, 277-279. Most states also created bicameral legislatures. See Gordon S. Wood,
The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998), pp. 197-256; Lutz, “State
Constitution Making,” esp. p. 274.
12 Holly A. Mayer, “The Continental Army,” in Greene and Pole, p. 309.
13 Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 30 (quotation).
14 Robert A. Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance, 1775-1787,” in Greene and Pole, pp. 388-389. The extent of the inflation
apparently occasioned some alarm in Congress. Benjamin Franklin wrote (most likely in 1780): “…the excessive Quantities
which Necessity oblig’d the Americans to issue, for continuing the War, occasion’d a Depreciation of Value…. To put an End
to this Evil, which destroy’d all Certainty in Commerce, the Congress first resolved to diminish the Quantity gradually by
Taxes…. By these Taxes 15 Millions of Dollars, of the 200 Millions extant, are to be brought in monthly and burnt. … Thirty
Millions have already been so destroy’d” (Benjamin Franklin, “Of the Paper Money of America,” [1780?], The Papers of Benjamin

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Franklin, Vol. 34, online version, accessed June 17, 2012,
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=34&page=228b).
15 Franklin, “Of the Paper Money of America.”
16 E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 35-44.
17 Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance,” pp. 391-392.
18 Jack N. Rakove, “The Articles of Confederation, 1775-1783,” in Greene and Pole, pp. 281-283.
19 Don Higginbotham, “The War for Independence, to Saratoga,” in Greene and Pole, American Revolution, pp. 287-296.
20 Rakove, “The Articles of Confederation,” pp. 283-284.
21 Rakove, “The Articles of Confederation,” p. 285.
22 Don Higginbotham, “The War for Independence, after Saratoga,” in Greene and Pole, American Revolution, pp. 298-302.
23 Quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), p.
393.
24 John Jay to George Washington, June 27, 1786, in The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, Vol. III, 1782-1793 (New
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891), p. 204 [http://books.google.com/books?id=jVkSAAAAYAAJ].
25 Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance,” p. 394. In 1782, Congress consolidated all of its various forms of debt (paper
money, military certificates, and so forth), arriving at the $27 million figure.
26 John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1898), p. 109.
27 Robert Morris, “Letter to the President of Congress,” in Francis Wharton (ed.) The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of
the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), Vol. 6, p. 309-311. Significantly, the role of “Superintendent
of Finance” was not an executive branch position—none existed under the Articles.
28 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, pp. 109-118.
29 Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance,” p. 395.
30 Stephen Higginson, quoted in Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, p. 222.
31 Becker, “Currency, Taxation, and Finance,” pp. 395-396.
32 Higginbotham, “The War for Independence, after Saratoga,” p. 305.
33 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, pp. 135, 137.
34 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History p. 152.
35 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, pp. 148-152.
36 Quoted in Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, pp. 142-148, quotation at 146.
37 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, pp. 108-109; and James Madison, “Proposed Amendment of Articles of
Confederation” (March 12, 1781), in J. C. A. Stagg, ed., The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2010).
38 Mark D. Kaplanoff, “Confederation: Movement for a Stronger Union,” in Greene and Pole, pp. 460-463.
39 Robert F. Haggard, “The Nicola Affair: Lewis Nicola, George Washington, and American Military Discontent during the
Revolutionary War,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, June 2002, Vol. 146, No. 2, pp. 156-158. Washington’s letter
to Nicola was dated May 22, 1782.
40 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 373-376. For a less severe assessment of the postwar economic downturn, see Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 394-395.
41 Quoted in William G. Anderson, The Price of Liberty: The Public Debt of the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University
Press of Virginia, 1983), p. 33.
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42 Woody Holton, “Did Democracy Cause the Recession That Led to the Constitution?” The Journal of American History,
September 2005, Vol. 92, No. 2, p. 445.
43 Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, p. 190.
44 Holton, “Did Democracy Cause the Recession?” esp. pp. 444-463.
45 Quoted in James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), p. 37.
46 See e.g. Richard D. Brown and Jack Tager, Massachusetts: A Concise History (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
2000), p. 100–106; Anderson, Price of Liberty, pp. 32–35.
47 George Washington, “To Henry Lee, Jr., 31 October 1786,” in Crackel, ed., Papers of George Washington.
48 “People and Ideas: James Madison,” [http://www.pbs.org/godinamerica/people/james-madison.html, accessed 15 July
2012].
49 Quoted in Irving Brant, “Madison: On the Separation of Church and State,” William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan.
1951), p. 5.
50 James Madison, a Biography in His Own Words, edited by Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Newsweek, 1974), pp. 14-41.
51 Peterson, James Madison, p. 90 and Ketcham, James Madison (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), p. 172.
52 James Madison, “To Thomas Jefferson, 16 March 1784,” in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison.
53 James Madison, “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies,” (April-June? 1786) in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison,
editor’s note.
54 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 183.
55 Madison, “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies.”
56 James Madison (with Alexander Hamilton), “The Federalist No. 20,” in The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 127.
57 James Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison, Section 1.
58 Madison, “Vices,” Section 7.
59 Madison, “Vices,” Section 7.
60 Madison, “Vices,” Section 5.
61 Madison, “Vices,” Section 4.
62 Madison, “Vices,” Section 11.
63 Charles F. Hobson, “The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican
Government,” The William and Mary Quarterly, April 1979, Vol. 36., No. 2, p. 225; George Klosko, History of Political Theory: An
Introduction, Volume II: Modern, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 249-251. See also Jacob T. Levy,
“Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism, and the Small-Republic Thesis,” History of Political Thought, Vol.
27, No. 1, 2006, pp. 50-90.
64 Madison, “Vices,” Section 7.
65 Madison, “Vices,” Section 11.
66 Articles of Confederation, Article 2.
67 Madison completed “Vices” in April 1787. In March, he wrote a letter to Thomas Jefferson describing several of the
proposals discussed here. See Madison, “To Thomas Jefferson, 19 March 1787,” in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison.
68 Madison, “To Edmund Randolph, 8 April 1787,” in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison.
69 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787,” in Stagg, ed., Papers of James Madison.
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70 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
71 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
72 Madison, “To Thomas Jefferson, 19 March 1787.” Emphasis in original.
73 Madison, “To Thomas Jefferson, 19 March 1787.”
74 In his letters, Madison compared the federal negative to the powers of the King of Great Britain. During the colonial era, the
Privy Council, made up of the king and his councilors, could review colonial court decisions and legislative acts and approve
or reject them. Reviews of court decisions required an appeal from a colonist about a specific case, but legislative acts could be
examined and negated at the Council’s whim. Madison based the federal negative on this second power. (LaCroix, “The
Authority for Federalism,” pp. 464-466, 472.)
75 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
76 Madison, “To Edmund Randolph, 8 April 1787.”
77 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
78 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
79 Madison, “To George Washington, 16 April 1787.”
80 Kaplanoff, “Confederation,” p. 468.
81 Madison may have prepared his “Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies” for consultation at this convention
(“Notes,” in Stagg, editor’s commentary).
82 Kaplanoff, “Confederation,” pp. 467-468.
83 Ketcham, James Madison, p. 195-196.
84 Quoted in Kevin R. C. Gutzman, James Madison and the Making of America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), p. 49.
85 The Virginia plan appears in Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 30-33 (May 29th). Because Delaware’s delegates had been
instructed not to agree “to any change of the rule of suffrage,” discussion of proportional representation of the states was
postponed to a later period beyond the scope of this case (pp. 37-38). Kaplanoff, “The Federal Convention and the
Constitution,” in Greene and Pole, p. 472, clarifies that “Quotas of contributions” meant taxes.
86 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 38 (May 31st).
87 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 39 (May 31st).
88 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 73 (June 6th).
89 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 40 (May 31st).
90 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 77 (June 6th).
91 John Dickinson, in Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 82 (June 7th).
92 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 194-195 (June 26).
93 John Dickenson, in Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 84 (June 7th).
94 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 83 (June 7th).
95 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 86-87 (June 7th).
96 Edmund Randolph (VA), in Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 45-46 (June 1st).
97 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 59 (June 4th).
98 Roger Sherman, quoted in Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 62 (June 4th). Sherman would be the author of the “Great
Compromise,” through which the Virginia Plan with its proportional state representation scheme for the Congress was
combined with the competing New Jersey Plan, which gave each state equal representation. The resulting plan called for one
proportional chamber and one with equal numbers of delegates for each state.
James Madison, the ‘Federal Negative,’ and the Making of the U.S. Constitution – Annotated Edition

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99 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 62-65 (June 4th).
100 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 34-35 (May 30th).
101 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 34 (May 30th).
102 Pierce Butler, quoted in Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 44 (May 31st).
103 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 44 (May 31st).
104 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 44 (May 31st).
105 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 88 (June 8th).
106 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 88-89 (June 8th).
107 Madison, Notes of Debates, p. 89 (June 8th).
108 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 90-91 (June 8th).
109 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 89-90 (June 8th).
110 Madison, Notes of Debates, pp. 89-92 (June 8th), quotation at 91.

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